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When the Federal Reserve was created in 1913, its instructions were to
prevent financial panics and bank runs. In the aftermath of the depres-
sion, its mandate was extended in the Employment Act of 1946 to
include the promotion of “maximum employment, production, and pur-
chasing power.” In 1978 the Full Employment and Balanced Gro w t h
Act required that the Fed pursue policies to “promote employment . . .
and reasonable price stability.”
Although this dual mandate is embodied in law, a debate continues in
Congress about making fighting inflation the Fed’s primary, or even sin-
gle, mission. The Price Stability Act, introduced in 1999, set price sta-
bility as the “primary and overriding goal of monetary policy.” The act
did not pass, but increasing support for changing the Fed’s mandate
makes it likely that similar legislation will be brought before Congress
again. Support for the single goal of inflation control rests partly on the
arguments that monetary policy is not effective in addressing unemploy-
ment and that even moderate rates of inflation can be harmful to eco-
nomic growth. Research Associate Willem Thorbecke rebuts these and
other arguments in the case for a primary goal of price stability. He also
sees positive reasons for emphasizing employment.
Thorbecke points out that the Fed, under its current dual mandate, has
been quite successful in fighting both inflation and unemployment, with
favorable results for macroeconomic conditions. In contrast, several
countries under the jurisdiction of the European Central Bank, which
has adopted inflation targeting, have double-digit unemployment rates.
When the U.S. economy seems to be doing so well under the curre n t
policy, he questions the wisdom of changing to a regime that has had far
P re f a c eless satisfactory results. Rather, U.S. officials should not consider narrow-
ing the Fed’s mandate and other countries should consider following the
U.S. model.
Thorbecke’s past research shows that when disinflationary policy has led
to an increase in unemployment, the costs to society as a whole are large
and the poorest and the lowest on the occupational ladder suffer most. If
a goal of U.S. economic policy is to maintain or improve the standards
of living of those at the bottom of the income distribution, it is impor-
tant that the Federal Reserve be re q u i red to consider the effects of its
policies on both employment and  price stability.  
I think you will find that Thorbecke presents an interesting analysis that
is a useful contribution to the debate on the dual mandate. As always, I
welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
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The Federal Reserve currently has two legislated goals: price stability
and full employment.1 The original Federal Reserve Act, in 1913,
contained no macroeconomic goals. Rather, it instructed the Fed to
p revent financial panics and bank runs by providing loans to the
banking system. In the aftermath of the Great Depression, the 1946
Employment Act re q u i red the Fed to pursue “conditions under which
t h e re will be aff o rded useful employment opportunities . . . for those
able, willing, and seeking to work, and to promote maximum employ-
ment, production, and purchasing power.” By the 1970s the term max-
imum employment was understood to mean not zero perc e n t
unemployment, but the level of unemployment that arises in a
healthy economy as employers and employees seek good matches. In
1978, the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act re q u i red the
federal government to “promote full employment . . . and re a s o n a b l e
price stability.” 
Although the dual mandate exists, Congress is now debating whether
the Federal Reserve should assign primacy to fighting inflation. In
response to re s e a rch on inflation targeting, Representative Jim Saxton
(R–N.J.) introduced the Price Stability Act of 1999. This act would
mandate price stability as the “primary and overriding goal” of mone-
t a ry policy; it would re q u i re the Federal Reserve to establish an
explicit numerical goal for inflation and to specify the time frame for
achieving this goal. Although the bill did not pass in 1999, momen-
tum in favor of inflation targeting is growing and the bill will be
i n t roduced again.
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T h e re are, however, several reasons why the Fed should continue to
emphasize full employment. First, under the current mandate the United
States has experienced low unemployment and low inflation, while
many countries whose central banks target inflation are experiencing
double-digit unemployment. Second, the costs of unemployment are
known to be substantial, while the costs of moderate inflation are proba-
bly not large. Third, central bankers tend to be inflation-averse and, if
anything, need to be prodded to pursue goals other than inflation.
Fourth, if the Fed pursues only price stability, the price level is not free
to increase; such an increase may be necessary to avoid a large rise in
unemployment following an adverse supply shock.
This paper reviews the behavior of the Fed under its current mandate. It
evaluates arguments for inflation targeting in light of recent monetary
policy experience. It then discusses why the Fed’s mandate should
include full employment. 
Federal Reserve Behavior under the Current Mandate
The Federal Reserve can affect inflation and unemployment through its
manipulation of the federal funds rate, the rate banks charge each other
on one-day loans. The Fed sets a target value for the funds rate and then
adjusts the amount of funds (re s e rves) in the banking system to cause
the funds rate to move toward the target value. When the funds rate
increases, longer-term interest rates tend to increase and the dollar tends
to appreciate. The increase in longer- t e rm rates reduces spending on
interest-sensitive items such as houses and automobiles; the appreciation
of the dollar reduces spending on net exports. As spending declines,
employment, output, and inflation decline as well. Thus, when the Fed
seeks to lower inflation, it raises the funds rate target, and when it seeks
to lower unemployment, it decreases the rate target. 
There is abundant evidence that the Fed adjusts the funds rate target in
response to fluctuations in output (and consequently employment) and
to fluctuations in inflation. One piece of evidence is the consistency of
actual federal funds rates with “Taylor’s rule.” Taylor’s rule is a method ofA Dual Mandate for the Federal Reserv e
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calculating a recommended rate, assigning equal weight to deviations of
output from its potential level and to deviations of inflation from its tar-
get (Taylor 1998). 2 As Figure 1 shows, the actual federal funds rate tracks
this recommended rate well. Formal statistical tests (e.g., Judd and
Rudebusch 1999) indicate that Taylor’s rule has closely predicted funds
rate movements during the Greenspan years.
A second piece of evidence comes from statements of Federal Reserv e
o fficials. Fed governor Laurence H. Meyer (1998) has stated that the
dual objectives of monetary policy are “short-run stabilization of output
relative to potential and long-run price stability.” Fed governor Roger
F e rguson (1999) similarly has said that the Fed accepts the mandated
goals of high employment, price stability, and moderate long-term inter-
est rates. Chairman Alan Greenspan (1997b) has remarked on the eas-
ing of monetary policy between 1990 and 1992 to achieve “a satisfactory
recovery from the recession of that period” and the tightening of policy
in 1994 and 1995 to prevent inflation from developing.
A third piece of evidence comes from the federal funds futures market.
The futures market reflects market expectations of changes in the fed-
eral funds rate one month in the future. Researchers (e.g., Burger 1999)
a8
Figure 1 Federal Funds Rate and Rate Recommended by Taylor’s Rule
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have found that news of higher than expected inflation raises the fed-
eral funds futures rate and news of higher than expected unemploy-
ment lowers the federal funds futures rate. This indicates that market
p a rticipants expect the Fed to raise the federal funds rate when infla-
tion increases and to lower the funds rate when unemployment
i n c reases. Thus, market participants, who bet money on their theories,
believe that the Fed tries to prevent both high inflation and high
u n e m p l o y m e n t .
A final piece of evidence comes from recent monetary policy history. At
times, for example in 1994, the Fed has raised the funds rate to fight
inflation, and at other times, for example in 1990 to 1992, the Fed has
lowered the funds rate to fight unemployment.
In recent years, during which the Fed has focused on both inflation and
unemployment, macroeconomic perf o rmance has been excellent. Both
unemployment and inflation in 1999 are near 30-year lows (see Figures 2
and 3). Since both high economic growth and low inflation benefit the
stock market (see Fischer and Merton 1984 and Boudoukh, Richardson,
and Whitelaw 1994), recent macroeconomic perf o rmance has con-
tributed to the 180 percent increase in the Dow Jones Industrial Average
between January 1995 and August 1999.
A Dual Mandate for the Federal Reserv e
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Figure 2  Unemployment Rate
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Inflation Ta r g e t i n g
In spite of the economy’s good perf o rmance under the dual mandate of
the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act, re s e a rch on inflation
t a rgeting has convinced many analysts that the mandate needs to be
changed. Inflation targeting has been advocated by distinguished econ-
omists such as Ben Bernanke and Frederic Mishkin. According to
B e rnanke and Mishkin (1997), inflation targeting involves announc-
ing clearly that low and stable inflation is the overriding goal of mone-
t a ry policy and specifying a target range for inflation. In some countries
(for example, New Zealand) central bank heads can lose their job, or
at least their reputation and prestige, if inflation exceeds the specified
t a rget range.
The case for inflation targeting rests on several arguments (Bern a n k e ,
Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen 1999). First, monetary policy cannot affect
real variables in the long run; it can affect only inflation. Second, mone-
t a ry policy cannot be used effectively to moderate short - run economic
fluctuations because it has an inflationary bias. Third, even mod e r a t e
rates of inflation are harmful to economic growth. Fourth, a nominal
anchor for monetary policy is necessary, and inflation targeting provides
such an anchor. 
Figure 3  Inflation Rate
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The idea that monetary policy can affect only inflation in the long run
comes from Milton Friedman’s (1968) and Edmund Phelps’s (1970) nat-
ural rate theory. They argued that expansionary monetary policy will
lower interest rates and increase spending. The increase in spending will
increase the price of goods and services before it increases the price of
labor. As firms receive more for what they produce and pay the same for
their labor input, their profits will increase. This will cause them to
increase employment and output. However, as workers realize that infla-
tion has increased, they will demand higher wages. As wages increase by
the same amount as prices, firms’ profits and thus their output and
employment return to their pre-expansionary levels. Inflation, however,
will be higher. The level of unemployment before the monetary expan-
sion begins and after it runs its course is labeled the natural rate.
Friedman and Phelps claimed that expansionary monetary policy causes
unemployment to fall below the natural rate temporarily and inflation to
increase above its initial level permanently.
A major reason why many doubt that discretionary policy can be used
e ffectively to moderate economic fluctuations is that they believe that
activist policy has an inflationary bias. The idea of an inflationary bias
springs from the work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and
Gordon (1983). These authors assume that the central bank wants both
unemployment below the natural rate and low inflation. An increase in
the money supply relative to the price level would temporarily re d u c e
unemployment. However, according to the natural rate theory, prices
and wages would eventually rise and unemployment would return to its
natural rate level. As firms and workers recognize that the central bank
is seeking temporary gains in employment through inflationary policy,
wages and prices would begin adjusting rapidly. Thus, a central bank
known to be seeking unemployment below the natural rate would tend
to create higher inflation (the inflationary bias) without affecting unem-
ployment on average.
B e rnanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999) have asserted that even
low inflation can impose costs on the economy. Because inflation compli-
cates long-term decision making, individuals and firms may make subop-
timal decisions about such things as how much to save for re t i rement and
how much capital to accumulate. Inflation, if unexpected, re d i s t r i b u t e s
wealth from lenders to borrowers. In addition, since taxes are not fullyA Dual Mandate for the Federal Reserv e
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indexed to inflation, inflation can lead to the flow of capital to sectors
that provide more favorable tax benefits rather than to sectors offering
higher before-tax re t u rns. Feldstein (1997) has argued that because of
distortions such as these, inflation should be reduced to zero. 
Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999) also discuss the impor-
tance of establishing a nominal anchor for policy, such as a target for
inflation or the exchange rate. Under the gold standard, the value of the
currency was defined in terms of gold, and currency and bank reserves
issued by the Federal Reserve were backed by gold. This limited the abil-
ity of the Fed to print money and so cause inflation. Under a system of
fiduciary money, such as the United States now has, the value of a dollar
is not backed by any commod i t y. Thus there is no constraint on how
much money the Fed can create and consequently on how much infla-
tion it can cause. By clearly communicating a commitment to price sta-
bility and acting accord i n g l y, the Fed could provide a nominal anchor
for the price level. The public would then be less likely to expect large
increases in inflation, and the Fed would have more freedom to stimu-
late the economy without generating inflationary fears.
M o n e t a r y Policy History from 1960 to 1999
To shed light on inflation targeting and on how monetary policy works
in the United States, a brief narrative of recent experience is useful. The
discussion that follows relates policy to the accelerating inflation of the
1970s, the painful disinflation of the 1980s, and the high gro w t h – l o w
inflation of the 1990s.
The 1960s was viewed as a successful time for macroeconomic policy and
for the economy (see Dornbusch, Fischer, and Startz 1998). The decade
s t a rted with a brief recession, from April 1960 to Febru a ry 1961, and a ris-
ing unemployment rate, which peaked at 7.1 percent (see Figure 2). In
1964 a cut in personal and corporate income taxes stimulated the econ-
o m y. Monetary policy accommodated the tax cut by holding interest rates
constant (see Okun 1970). Unemployment responded by falling below 5
p e rcent in 1965 and not exceeding 4 percent from 1966 to 1970.
The stimulus from the tax cut coupled with spending on the Vietnam Wa r
generated concern that demand was too high relative to the e c o n o m y ’sThe Pursuit of Price Stability and Full Employment
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ability to produce. In 1966 and 1967 monetary policy sought to prevent
the economy from overheating. President Lyndon Johnson, despite
warnings about incipient inflation, was unwilling to restrict fiscal policy.
F i n a l l y, in 1968 he agreed to a temporary tax cut, which did little to
reduce total spending or inflation (see Eisner 1971). Inflation at the end
of the decade was about 6 percent, up from about 1 percent in 1960 (see
Figure 3).
In 1971 President Richard Nixon instituted wage and price controls to
fight inflation, and Federal Reserve chairman Arthur Burns imple-
mented expansionary monetary policy. Burns hoped that price controls
could contain inflation, leaving him free to pursue expansionary policy
(Pierce 1979). What actually happened was that the expansionary policy
raised the underlying inflation rate.
Inflation was aggravated by the oil embargo that began in October 1973
and lasted until March 1974. The rate of change of the consumer price
index rose from 5.5 percent before the crisis to over 11 percent at the
end of 1974. Inflation of this magnitude had not been seen in the
United States for nearly 30 years.
In April 1974 the Fed shifted its emphasis to fighting inflation. Over the
second and third quarters of 1974 it focused on slowing the growth rate
of the money supply. By reducing money supply growth, the Fed caused
the federal funds rate to rise by more than 450 basis points between
M a rch and July. Bernanke, Gert l e r, and Watson (1997), using a tech-
nique called impulse-response functions, find that this funds rate
i n c rease can be explained mainly by concern about inflation. Other
interest rates rose along with the funds rate, contributing to a slowdown
in interest-sensitive sectors and a recession.3
The Fed did succeed in bringing inflation down, although at a large cost
in terms of unemployment. Between 1974 and 1976 trend inflation
declined 4 percentage points (Ball 1994). As Figure 2 shows, aggregate
unemployment increased 3.5 percentage points between the summer of
1974 and 1975, when it reached a peak for the decade of 9.0 percent. 
A second oil price shock hit in 1979, triggering inflation and anti-
inflationary monetary policy. In October 1979, with inflation exceedi n g
a13A Dual Mandate for the Federal Reserv e
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10 percent and the unemployment rate at 6 percent, Chairman Paul
Volcker declared his commitment to price stability. Accepting the
a rguments of monetarists such as Friedman, he attempted to re d u c e
money supply growth to fight inflation. The growth of the M1 money
supply (i.e., currency plus checkable deposits) was steadily re d u c e d
f rom 9 percent at an annual rate for the first three quarters of 1979 to
4.6 percent at an annual rate for the first two quarters of 1982. This
m o n e t a ry contraction was associated with an increase of 800 basis
points in the federal funds rate and of about 500 basis points in long-
t e rm Tre a s u ry and corporate bond yields. Interest-sensitive sectors
w e re decimated, with employment declining 18.3 percent in durable
g o ods and 14.6 percent in construction between September 1979 and
the end of 1982.
The declines in interest-sensitive sectors reduced economic activity
m o re generally, causing inflation to fall and unemployment to soar.
Between 1979 and 1982, trend inflation declined 8 percentage points
(Ball 1994). As Figure 2 shows, between the fall of 1979 and the end of
1982, aggregate unemployment increased 4.9 percentage points from 5.9
percent to 10.8 percent.
The Fed eased monetary policy and helped the economy recover in the
second half of 1982. It deemphasized money supply growth targets and
focused more on short - t e rm interest rates. It allowed the federal funds
rate to fall 5.2 percentage points between June and December 1982,
f rom 14.15 percent to 8.95 percent. The stock market soared immedi-
ately on learning that the Fed was easing and the recession ended in
November 1982.
While the U.S. disinflation was accompanied by a short, painful re c e s-
sion, disinflations in several other countries were accompanied by
l o n g e r, but less painful recessions. The disinflation lasted three years in
the United States but six years in Denmark and France, seven years in
I reland and Italy, and eight years in Spain. Unemployment benefits
lasted for six months in the United States, but averaged three years
in the other countries. Ball (1996) found that countries with longer
d i s i n f l a t i o n a ry periods and greater durations for unemployment bene-
fits experienced larger increases in the long-term (natural) rate of
unemployment. 
a14The Pursuit of Price Stability and Full Employment
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Ball interpreted this finding as consistent with the concept of hysteresis.
H y s t e resis implies that disinflationary monetary policy that raises the
actual rate of unemployment can also raise the natural rate of unemploy-
ment. Ball reasoned that countries with longer recessions are more likely
to have workers who are unemployed for long periods of time, and long-
lived unemployment benefits allow them a longer duration of unemploy-
ment. During unemployment, workers may lose job skills, lose their
desire to work, or become less effective in searching for jobs. In this way
recessions can increase the number of long-term unemployed. The
i n c rease in the natural rate of unemployment in countries with longer
d i s i n f l a t i o n a ry periods and greater duration for unemployment benefits
suggests that monetary policy can have long-run effects on real variables.
As the U.S. economy began recovering in 1983, Milton Friedman and
other monetarists continually warned that inflation would reemerge and
that contractionary monetary policy was necessary. In the September 26,
1983, issue of Newsweek, Friedman said that inflation would take off in
1984 and a recession would develop (cited in B. Friedman 1988).
Writing in the American Economic Review, Milton Friedman (1984) pre-
dicted that inflation would be much higher in 1983 to 1985 than it was
in 1981 to 1983. In an interview in the March 19, 1984, issue of
F o rt u n e, he noted the strong possibility that the inflation rate could
equal 9 perc e n t .
It turned out that the economy’s perf o rmance over the next several years
was excellent. Inflation did not accelerate in 1984 and averaged only 3.5
p e rcent between 1984 and 1988. Unemployment fell from 8 percent to 5.3
p e rcent. The expansion that began in November 1982 lasted 92 months—
in duration, a peacetime expansion second only to the current one.
In 1988 the Fed allowed the federal funds rate to increase 300 basis
points to contain inflationary pressure. Inflation, which usually responds
with a lag to monetary policy, climbed to 6.2 percent in November 1990
and then quickly fell to 2.9 percent by December 1991. It hovere d
around 3 percent for a year and then fell again. If the inflation rate is
m e a s u red excluding the volatile food and energy sectors, it fell fro m
about 5.5 percent at the end of 1990 to 3.75 percent at the end of 1991
to 3.25 percent at the end of 1992.A Dual Mandate for the Federal Reserv e
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When the disinflationary monetary policy of the 1970s and 1980s
reduced inflation, the accompanying slowdown dispro p o rtionately bur-
dened minorities and less-advantaged workers. While white unemploy-
ment increased 3.4 percentage points during the 1974 to 1975
disinflation, Hispanic unemployment increased 6.2 percentage points
and African American unemployment increased 5.4 percentage points.
While white unemployment reached a peak of 8.4 percent, Hispanic
unemployment reached 14.3 percent and black unemployment 15.3 per-
cent. Similarly during the 1979 to 1982 disinflation, while white unem-
ployment increased 4.5 percentage points, Hispanic unemployment
increased 8.1 percentage points and black unemployment 9.5 percentage
points. White unemployment peaked at 9.7 percent, Hispanic unem-
ployment at 15.7 percent, and black unemployment at 21.2 perc e n t .4
These shocks to the less advantaged came while they were already faring
badly because of changes in the stru c t u re of the U.S. economy (see
Bradbury 1996 and Council of Economic Advisers 1997).
From 1990 to 1992 the Fed shifted its focus to stimulating the economy.
It lowered the federal funds rate target 23 times to fight the recession.
Unemployment, which also responds with a lag to monetary policy, con-
tinued to rise until it reached 7.7 percent in July 1992 and then quickly
fell to 6.5 percent by the end of 1993.
In February 1994, although the inflation rate was below 2.5 percent, the
Fed began a preemptive strike against inflation. It raised its target for the
funds rate 25 basis points. It raised the target again in March and April
by 25 basis points and in May by 50 basis points. In all, it raised the
funds rate target six times in 1994 and one time in February 1995. The
strike was evidently effective, for inflation stayed below 3 percent except
for a brief blip caused by higher food and energy prices. 
In 1996 and 1997 the Fed faced a quandary. The unemployment rates of
5.4 percent in 1996 and 4.9 percent in 1997 were below most estimates of
the natural rate of unemployment. Most economists thought unemploy-
ment this low would inevitably lead to inflation (Rivlin 1999). Phelps
(1996), for instance, stated that the low unemployment rate would cause
inflation to turn up later that year. However, inflation remained quiescent.
The Fed had to decide whether to slow the economy or permit it to gro w.The Pursuit of Price Stability and Full Employment
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Wall Street was betting that the Fed would not continue to perm i t
unemployment to fall. At least five times during 1996, news of a strong
economy caused major stock price plunges. The fact that stock prices
tended to fall more for stocks sensitive to contractionary monetary pol-
icy indicates that financial markets thought that the strong economy
would trigger anti-inflationary monetary policy (Thorbecke and
Coppock 1997).
Instead, the Fed allowed unemployment to continue falling, and infla-
tion fell also. Unemployment dropped below 5 percent in early 1997 and
fell steadily to 4.2 percent in May 1999. Inflation was below 2 percent in
all but two months between November 1997 and May 1999. Even
excluding food and energy prices, inflation in May 1999 was still 2 per-
cent. Both the unemployment and the inflation outcomes were the best
in almost 30 years. 
The strong labor market has brought many benefits to less-advantaged
groups. The 1999 Economic Report of the President states:
High unemployment in Europe in recent years may have increased the
natural rate of unemployment. It seems that a reverse situation has
occurred in the United States, and a strong labor market is decreasing
the natural rate. As Greenspan (1997a, 1) stated, the “expansion has
enabled many in the working age population, a large number of whom
would have remained out of the labor force or among the longer- t e rm
unemployed, to acquire work experience and improved skills.”
If low unemployment has enabled workers to improve job skills, it also
would have contributed to increased productivity and thus to holding
Public Policy Brief
G roups whose economic status has not improved in the past
decades are now experiencing pro g ress. The real wages of blacks
and Hispanics have risen rapidly in the past 2 to 3 years, and their
unemployment rates are at long-time lows; employment among
male high school dropouts, single women with children, and immi-
grants, as well as among blacks and Hispanics, has increased, and
the gap in earnings between immigrant and native workers is nar-
rowing. (Council  of Economic Advisers 1999, 99)A Dual Mandate for the Federal Reserv e
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down inflation. Prior to the last three years, conventional wisdom held
that allowing unemployment to fall and employing marginal workers
would reduce productivity and trigger inflation (see Coy 1997 and Nasar
and Mitchell 1999). However, according to Rivlin (1999), pro v i d i n g
workers with training in the use of new equipment and techniques has
combined with factors such as greater outsourcing to raise productivity.
The productivity increase has allowed firms to pay higher wages without
leading to inflationary pressure.
Relevance of Recent Monetary Policy Experience for 
Inflation Ta rg e t i n g
Recent experience in the United States is relevant to evaluating argu-
ments for switching to inflation targeting as the primary goal of mone-
t a ry policy: monetary policy can affect only inflation and not re a l
variables in the long run; monetary policy cannot be used to moderate
short-run economic fluctuations because it has an inflationary bias; infla-
tion targeting provides a nominal anchor for monetary policy; and mod-
erate rates of inflation harm economic growth. 
Recent events present reasons to question the idea that monetary policy
cannot affect real variables in the long run. As discussed above, Ball
(1996) found that, consistent with hysteresis, countries with longer dis-
i n f l a t i o n a ry periods and greater durations for unemployment benefits
experienced increases in the natural rate of unemployment. U.S. experi-
ence in the 1990s indicates that low unemployment may have enabled
unemployed workers to find jobs and improve their skills, lowering the
natural rate of unemployment. If the natural rate of unemployment (a
l o n g - run real variable) can be affected by policy, the case for inflation
targeting is weakened. 
Monetary policy history also casts doubt on the arguments that there is
an inflationary bias to monetary policy and that an explicit nominal
anchor is necessary. In 1979 the Fed engineered a painful disinflation,
and it has since kept inflation low, sometimes through pre e m p t i v e
strikes. The Fed kept inflation low without adopting the binding ru l e s
or institutional changes that Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and
G o rdon (1983) advocated (Blinder 1998). The Fed also kept inflationThe Pursuit of Price Stability and Full Employment
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low without using an explicit nominal anchor such as a target for the
exchange rate or inflation (Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen
1 9 9 9 ) .
The evidence is inconclusive that moderate inflation (say, below 4 per-
cent) could be so costly that the Fed must make controlling inflation its
overriding goal. Simple theory implies that sustained inflation is almost
costless (B. Friedman 1998). Perfectly anticipated inflation would cause
labor contracts, interest rates, and other intertemporal transactions to
have inflation adjustments written in. The costs associated with this
type of inflation would involve businesses changing price tags, re s t a u-
rants changing menus, and individuals making more trips to the bank to
withdraw curre n c y. Most economists view these costs as minuscule.
Unanticipated inflation does have the costs discussed earlier (see page
12), but it is not clear that those costs are large. In one study, Robert
B a rro (1995) found that increasing inflation by 1.0 percentage point
reduces economic growth by between 0.02 and 0.03 percentage point.5
Although Barro ’s estimate is lower than some others, it illustrates that
the evidence on the costs of moderate inflation is mixed.  
So, we see that recent experience challenges the arguments underlying
inflation targeting. It indicates that monetary policy can affect real vari-
ables, not only inflation, in the long run; there is not an inflationary bias
to monetary policy; an explicit nominal anchor is not necessary; and
moderate inflation may not impose large costs on society. Thus, there are
several reasons to question whether the Fed’s mandate should be
changed to make low inflation the “primary and overriding goal” of
monetary policy. 
W hy the Fe d ’s Mandate Should Continue to 
Emphasize Unemploy m e n t
T h e re are many reasons why the Fed’s mandate should include full
employment as well as low inflation. First, the macroeconomic condi-
tions that have prevailed while the Fed has been pursuing both full
employment and price stability have been wonderful. Second, the costs
of high unemployment are substantial. Third, central bankers tend to
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focus on inflation and, if anything, need to be prodded to consider other
conditions and to pursue other goals. Fourth, by assigning weight to real
variables, the Fed would avoid some of the lost output and lost employ-
ment associated with supply shocks.
M a c roeconomic conditions provide the first reason for maintaining a
dual mandate. While some might argue that in recent years the Fed has
focused solely on inflation, the evidence from Taylor’s rule, statements of
Federal Reserve governors, the behavior of the federal funds futures mar-
ket, and recent monetary policy history indicate that high employment
as well as price stability have been goals of the Fed. Greenspan (1999)
recently stated, “By themselves, neither rising wages nor swelling
employment rolls pose a risk to sustained economic growth. Indeed, the
Federal Reserve welcomes such developments and has attempted to
gauge its policy in recent years to allow the economy to realize its full,
enhanced potential.” Economic perf o rmance has been excellent while
the Fed has been following its statutory mandate in this way. Both unem-
ployment and inflation are near 30-year lows. By contrast, seven of the
eleven countries under the jurisdiction of the European Central Bank,
which has adopted inflation targeting, have unemployment rates exceed-
ing 10 percent. With the U.S. economy faring so well under the current
monetary policy regime, it seems unwise to switch to a regime that has
not produced similar results in other countries.
The second reason is the large cost that unemployment imposes on indi-
viduals and the economy. Because the Fed lowers inflation primarily
t h rough lowering aggregate demand and employment, the more it seeks to
stabilize inflation, the more it will destabilize employment in the short ru n
( F u h rer 1997). Dornbusch, Fischer, and Startz (1998) calculate that the
fact that unemployment in 1992 was 2 percentage points above the nat-
ural rate implies that gross domestic product was 4 percent less than it oth-
e rwise would have been (in 1999, 4 percent of GDP was equal to about
$350 billion). In addition to this loss to the economy, heavy losses are
imposed on individuals. Thorbecke (1997, forthcoming) shows that the
individuals who bear the brunt of disinflationary policy tend to be poore r
and lower on the occupational ladder. They consequently are less able to
weather the difficulties caused by losing a job. Not only do they suff e r
m o n e t a r i l y, but also in terms of dignity, self-esteem, and forgone training.
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One study, perf o rmed by Harvey Brenner of Johns Hopkins University
(Abel and Bernanke 1998, 461), found that an increase in unemployment
of 1 percentage point that lasts for six years is correlated with 20,000 more
deaths from heart disease, 4,000 new admissions to mental hospitals, 3,300
new prison inmates, 920 suicides, and 650 homicides.
A third reason the Fed should be mandated to focus on unemployment is
that central bankers tend to focus on inflation and to be inflation averse.
M o n e t a ry theory teaches that in the long run inflation is a monetary
phenomenon. Monetary policymakers can take a long-run perspective
because they are not vulnerable to short-term electoral cycles; they do so
also because they are not able to smooth out transitory shocks anyway.
Telling a central banker to focus on inflation is like telling a defensive
lineman to focus on tackling the quarterback. He will do that without
advice. What is necessary is to tell him to watch also for a screen pass or
a draw play. In the same way, it is necessary to tell a central banker to
consider also unemployment and real economic activity.
Some might argue that Alan Greenspan has been successful because he
focuses on inflation and that this approach should be encoded in legisla-
tion. However, in the hands of someone without Greenspan’s deep grasp
of the economy, the re q u i rement that low inflation be the overr i d i n g
goal of monetary policy could have bad outcomes. For instance, in 1996,
when most economists thought that unemployment was below the nat-
ural rate, a central banker mandated to achieve only price stability could
easily have prevented unemployment from falling furt h e r. He or she
could have argued that unemployment was at its maximum sustainable
level, and most economists would have agreed. However, if the Fed
c h a i rman is also mandated to consider employment gains, he or she
might be emboldened at strategic times to take risks and let unemploy-
ment fall. The results after 1996 were that unemployment fell more than
a percentage point and employment increased by more than 7 million
workers. The benefits of this strong labor market have accrued to low-
skilled workers, minorities, and single mothers without triggering infla-
tion. It would have been tragic if these gains to less-advantaged
individuals had been lost because the Fed kept unemployment higher to
fight a nonexistent inflation.6
a21A Dual Mandate for the Federal Reserv e
Public Policy Brief a22
A fourth problem with mandating price stability is that it would aggra-
vate the employment losses that follow a supply shock, such as an oil
price increase. The short - run consequences of a supply shock of this type
a re a rise in both inflation and unemployment. As Friedman and Kuttner
(1996) explain, following a negative supply shock, the wage relative to
the price level (in jargon, the real wage) has to be allowed to fall in ord e r
to avoid large increases in unemployment. Because in the United States
it is hard to cut workers’ absolute wages (see Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry
1996), an increase in the price level is necessary to cut real wages and
minimize employment losses. If the Fed is pursuing price stability exclu-
s i v e l y, the price level would not be free to increase, and an adverse supply
shock would multiply unemployment.
The Fed is currently mandated to pursue both price stability and full
employment. Under this modus operandi for monetary policy, unemploy-
ment and inflation are both near 30-year lows. However, despite the
exceptional macroeconomic perf o rmance, several economists re c o m m e n d
that the Fed target only low inflation. Recent monetary policy experience
p rovides several reasons to question the validity of their arg u m e n t s .
When Michael Jordon retired from basketball in 1998, he had set several
records and led his team to six National Basketball Association champi-
onships. Whatever training regime he followed obviously worked.
S i m i l a r l y, the current monetary policy regime, which emphasizes both
unemployment and inflation, is obviously working. The dual mandate
has allowed the Fed to focus on one or the other goal as conditions
demand and to balance the effects of policy decisions. Changing this
a p p roach, which has contributed to outstanding macroeconomic out-
comes, seems unwise. Instead, officials in inflation-targeting countries
should consider assigning weight to unemployment as well as to inflation
in formulating monetary policy.
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Notes
I thank Lynndee Kemmet for valuable comments.
1. This section draws on the discussion by Judd and Rudebusch (1999).
A c c o rding to Blinder (1996), the Fed has a third legislated goal, “mod e r a t e
long-term interest rates.” However, since achieving price stability will almost
surely produce low long-term rates, the Fed is viewed as having a dual man-
date of pursuing full employment and stable prices. 
2. The rule used in Figure 1 is R = R* + p + 0.5y + 0.5(p – p*), where R is the
nominal federal funds rate recommended by Ta y l o r’s rule, R* is the equilib-
rium real federal funds rate, p is the inflation rate, y is the difference between
potential output and actual output, and p* is the desired inflation rate. 
3. Sharp increases in the prime rate, the commercial paper rate, and mort g a g e
rates disrupted the banking sector and contributed to output declines in 1974
of 27 percent in housing and 9 percent in the durable goods sector (Thorbecke
forthcoming).
4. Thorbecke (1997, forthcoming) presents additional evidence from vector
a u t o re g ressions and a social accounting matrix indicating that low-income,
urban workers suffered more from recent disinflations.
5. He performed the study for the Bank of England and caused it embarrassment
when the press reported that it had found inflation to be costless (“The Cost
of Inflation” 1995).  
6. The same might be said of 1983. Milton Friedman forcefully warned about
inflation and demanded that money growth be reined in. The Fed ignored his
w a rning. Inflation remained moderate, unemployment fell rapidly, and the
U.S. economy experienced a 92-month recovery. 
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